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The article explores the now famous cases of Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois
and their relation to the trend and rationales of the confession doctrines that have been developed
by the Supreme Court of the United States during the last few decades. From his unique vantage
point as a prosecutor turned academician, Professor Robinson critically examines the validity of the
Court's assumptions and holding in Escobedo and projects the future impact of that opinion upon
the administration of criminal justice in the United States.-EDIoR.
INTRODUCTION
Last year the Supreme Court of the United
States decided two already famous cases which
seem likely to have revolutionary impact on Ameri-
can criminal procedure.
Massiah v. United States' reversed the conviction
of a merchant seaman who had been charged with
violating the federal narcotics laws. Because of the
quantity of drugs involved, federal narcotics
officers suspected that the defendant was a part of
a substantial criminal organization. The officers
sought to continue their investigation into this
enterprise and to obtain further incriminating in-
formation as to Massiah himself, although the
latter had been indicted and released on bail. The
cooperation of a co-defendant, one Colson, was
obtained. Colson agreed that the government
might install a radio transmitter under the seat of
his car. A receiver permitted a government agent
to overhear what was said. Massiah made in-
criminating statements to Colson in this car, and
the agent divulged the conversation at the trial.
2
The defendant argued before the Supreme Court
that the use of the radio transmitter constituted
not only a violation of his fourth amendment right
to be free from unreasonable search but a viola-
1377 U.S. 201 (1964).
2 The government apparently decided not to attempt
to use Colson as a witness to this conversation because
he had previously informed the court that he and his
family had been threatened with death if he testified.
See Record, vol. 2, p. 16.
tion of the fifth and sixth amendments as well,
since incriminating statements had been elicited
from him in the absence of counsel. The Court put
aside the fourth amendment argument. 3 The ma-
jority, speaking through Justice Stewart, held that
the sixth amendment right to counsel had been
violated by the introduction into evidence of the
fruits of the interrogation. Relying on language
contained in concurring opinions in Spdno v.
New York, 4 the Court stated:
"... [U]nder our system of justice the most
elemental concepts of due process of law con-
template that an indictment be followed by a
trial, 'in an orderly courtroom, presided over
by a judge, open to the public, and protected
by all the procedural safeguards of the law."
***It was said that a Constitution which
guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at
such a trial could surely vouchsafe no less to
an indicted defendant under interrogation by
the police in a completely extrajudicial pro-
ceeding. Anything less, it was said, might deny
3 In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1951),
another federal narcotics case, the accused while free
on bail was visited on his own premises by a federal
undercover agent with a radio transmitter concealed on
his person. Testimony as to admissions made by the
defendant was presented by a second federal agent who
had received the radio transmissions. The Court sus-
tained the conviction on the basis that there had been
no unlawful invasion of the defendant's premises and
hence no fourth amendment violation.
4360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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a defendant 'effective representation by counsel
at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him.' -5
Fscobedo v. Illinois6 reversed a murder conviction
of a defendant also on the basis that he had been
denied the assistance of counsel. The defendant
had been taken into custody for interrogation
shortly after his brother-in-law had been fatally
shot. After a number of hours of unsuccessful
effort by the Chicago police to obtain incrimina-
tory admissions from him, the defendant was re-
leased pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. Ten
days later, one DiGerlando, later a co-defendant,
told the police that Escobedo had fired the fatal
shots. The latter was then rearrested. Escobedo's
lawyer, who had been in daily consultation with
him since his prior arrest, reached the police station
shortly after his client, but was not permitted to
see him. The defendant's requests to consult the
lawyer were likewise denied by the police. After
confronting DiGerlando (who was also in custody),
the defendant confessed, stating that he had hired
DiGerlando to kill his brother-in-law and had
driven him to the scene of the homicide because
the deceased had been abusing Escobedo's sister.
After a number of general criticisms of the utiliza-
tion of private police interrogation to obtain con-
fessions, the Court concluded:
"We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police custody, the police carry out
a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the sus-
pect has requested and been denied an oppor-
tunity to consult with his lawyer, and the
police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent,
the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of
Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,'
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 342, 83 S.
Ct., at 795 and that no statement elicited by
the police during the interrogation may be
used against him at a criminal trial."7
The purpose of this article is to review and evalu-
ate some of the rationales for the now broadening
5 377 U.S. at 204.
6378 U.S. 478 (1964).7 1d. at 490-491.
doctrines tepding toward the exclusions of con-
fessions8 in trials of criminal cases.
I. PROTECTING THE TRusTwoRTINEss
OF THE TRUTH-SEEKING PROCESS
Empirical and Comnon Law Bases
The classic rationale for the exclusion of con-
fessions, both as a matter of constitutional law and
of the law of evidence, is that some confessions are
believed to be untrustworthy.9 The orthodox prin-
ciple excludes confessions when the circumstances
under which they were obtained are such as to in-
dicate a substantial danger of inducement to make
a false statement. Conversely, it assumes that con-
fessions made in the absence of such inducement
have probative value. This inference rests largely
on the common sense notion that an innocent per-
son will not ordinarily wish to imperil his freedom
by making a false admission of criminal guilt. In
the past this assumption has almost invariably
been unquestioned.
The first Mr. justice Harlan observed:
"... A confession, if freely and voluntarily
made, is evidence of the most satisfactory
character....
Elementary writers of authority concur in
saying that, while from the very nature of such
evidence it must be subjected to careful scru-
tiny and received with great caution, a de-
liberate, voluntary confession of guilt is among
the most effectual proofs in the law, and con-
stitutes the strongest evidence against the
party making it that can be given of the facts
stated in such confession.' 0
Professor Wigmore expressed a similar view:
"In the first place, the only real danger and
weakness in a confession-the danger of a false
statement-is of a slender character, and the
cases of that sort are of the rarest occurrence.
No trustworthy figures of authenticated in-
stances exist; but they are concededly few.
For purposes of this article the term "confessions"
is used unusually broadly, in the interest of brevity.
It therefore includes not only admission of all of the
elements of a crime, but also of individual elements,
of subordinate facts relevant to culpability, and of
exculpatory statements relevant to a showing of guilty
knowledge or to self-contradiction.
9 3 WIGMosx ON EVIDENCE §822 (3d ed. 1940).
The common wording of this test in terms of volition
is preferably avoided because of its inescapable am-
biguity. See 3 VIGMOIE ON EVIDENCE §824 (3d ed.
1940); Kamisar, What is an Involuntary Confession?
17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963).
10 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1883).
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Now if it were a question of receiving the con-
fession as conclusive, t.e. as equivalent to a
plea of guilty, we might well prefer to be ex-
tremely cautious (as under the early tradi-
tional practice already described), and let the
trial take its ordinary course. But as it is a
mere matter of giving or not giving one more
piece of evidence to the jury, as it is impossible
to determine beforehand the real weight of any
confession, and as the accused has ample op-
portunity of offering any facts affecting the
weight of the confession, it is entirely unneces-
sary to bar out all confessions whatever by
broad and artificial tests, merely on account of
this slender and rare risk of falsity. To employ
an anomalous occurrence as the basis of indis-
criminate exclusion is not reasonable. It is
simply, in the language of Chief Justice
Paxson already quoted, an exhibition of senti-
mentalism toward the guilty."'
1
A probable exception to the general consensus
of writers and courts as to the reliability of con-
fession evidence in American trials is contained in
the Escobedo assertion:
"We have learned the lesson of history,
ancient and modern, that a system of criminal
law enforcement which comes to depend on the
'confession,' will in the long run, be less reli-
able and more subject to abuses than a system
which depends on extrinsic evidence independ-
ently secured through skillful investiga-
tion .... 2 ,
However, the authorities cited by the Court in
support of the quoted statement 13 on the reliability
113 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §867 (3d ed. 1940).
Professor McCormick came to a similar conclusion.
McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the
Admissability of Confessions, 24 Txx. L. REv. 239,
246 (1946); MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
OF EvIDENCE §109 (1954). Compare the statement of
Justice Jackson: ".... [O]nce a confession is obtained
it supplies ways of verifying its trustworthiness....
Such corroboration consists in one case of finding a
weapon where the accused has said he hid it, and in
others that conditions which could only have been
known to one who was implicated correspond with
his story. It is possible, but it is rare, that a confession,
if repudiated on the trial, standing alone will convict
unless there is external proof of its verity." Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 60 (1949) (concurring opinion).
378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
13 "See Committee Print, Subcommittee to In-
vestigate Administration of the Internal Security Act,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary; 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., reporting and analyzing the proceedings at the
XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, February 25, 1956, exposing the false confession
obtained during the Stalin purges of the 1930's. See
also Miller v. United States, 320 F.2d 767, 772-773
of such a system are generally inapposite to the
American system of criminal justice. 4
The argument of those inclined to the view that
"voluntary" confessions constitute evidence suffi-
ciently credible to survive an exclusionary principle
based on nontrustworthiness is not that the inno-
cent never confess. It is not that given the full re-
sources, unlimited time, and insensitivity to per-
sonal suffering of modern totalitarian states, sys-
tematic false confessions cannot be obtained. It
is simply that the truth-seeking process is far more
reliable when confession evidence is added to such
other evidence as may be available than when it is
excluded. At best the facilities which we have to
assist a tribunal in determining disputed matters
of historical fact fall short of the ideal. But other
likely sources of information, such as reports of
eyewitnesses, frequently relating to events im-
perfectly perceived and remembered and testimony
accomplices, for example, do not, in the absence of
Reform and the Psychology of Totalism (1963);
Rogge, Why Men Confess (1959); Schein, Coercive
Persuasion (1961)." Id. at 489, n. 11.
14 The printed title of the referenced Senate Judiciary
material is "Speech of Nikita Khruschev Before a
Closed Session of the XXth Congress of the Com-
munist Part), of the Soviet Union on February 25,
1956." The "analysis" is a brief summary and com-
mentary on the speech by the Free Trade Union Com-
mittee (AFL-CIO). The confessions during the Stalin
purges were obtained by long periods of physical
torture and threats of death, according to the speech.
See id. at 34-43, 53-56. For example, Stalin's personal
instructions in the case of the so-called doctor's plot
were quoted as "beat, heat and, once again, beat."
Id. at 53-54. The Miller case involved the relevance of
evidence of flight after the commission of a crime to
establish guilt. It was apparently cited because of
Judge Bazelon's footnoted reference to a bibliography
of literary, psychoanalytic, and general sociological
material. The Lifton and Schein books are studies of
brainwashing in Communist China in which prisoners
were subjected to torture, continuous confinement,
and semicontinuous interrogation, often for periods of
years. The Rogge book is also primarily a discussion of
communist confession producing techniques, although
it attempts to illustrate confession situations through
the ages and to give a psychoanalytically-oriented
interpretation.
The Court in Escobedo proceeded on to cite 8 Wig-
more On Evidence 309 (3d ed. 1940) as to the author's
argument against the abolition of the privilege against
self-incrimination in judicial proceedings. While Wig-
more did defend the privilege against advocates of
compulsory disclosure in judicial proceedings his views
on confessions were strongly to the contrary, as has
been indicated above. Nevertheless, in view of the
substantial overlap in policies between the confession
rule and the privilege against self-incrimination, it is
difficult to reconcile Wigmore's disparate treatment of
them.
The applicability of the privilege against self-in-
crimination to the confession situation is discussed
infra pp. 416-418.
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(opinion of Chief Judge Bazelon); Lifton, Thought
empirical data which we lack, appear to offer more
reliable sources of information.
In both the Borchard and Frank studies1 5 of
convictions in which strong subsequent evidence
later appeared that the defendant was innocent,
confessions were not commonly blamed, although
almost all of the cases arose at a time when control
of police practices was less careful than today.
Both the Borchard and Frank 2 studies indi-
cated the most common source of error to be re-
liance on eyewitnesses. If unreliability of con-
fessions requires their exclusion, a fortiori, it would
appear that eyewitness testimony should also be
excluded.
Yet it cannot be doubted that the circumstances
of in-custody interrogation present real problems
for a trier of fact in determining the conditions
under which a confession was made. The defendant
characteristically must rely upon his own testi-
mony, which is likely to be discounted because of
self interest and because of contradictory testi-
mony given by the police. Escobedo is itself an in-
teresting example of this. The defendant alleged
that he had confessed to hiring DiGerlando to
carry out the murder on the promise by the police
that if he (Escobedo) made a statement implicating
DiGerlando, there would be no prosecution of
himself. The Illinois Supreme Court initially re-
versed the conviction on the assumption that the
confession was induced by this promise. On peti-
tion for rehearing the state pointed out that this
assertion of the defendant was contradicted by the
testimony of the police, and the Illinois court
thereupon unanimously affirmed the conviction. 6
The Supreme Court noted the conflict in testimony,
stated that it was authorized to resolve it itself,
but found it unnecessary to do so in view of the
15 BoRgcHAR, CONVICTInG THE INNOcENT (1932);
FRANK & FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957). Borchard's
study of 65 erroneous convictions indicated that in 29
cases, the identification of the accused by the victim
of a crime of violence was practically alone responsible
for the error. In 15 additional cases mistaken identifi-
cation was supplemented by circumstantial evidence.
Perjury by hostile witnesses accounted for an ad-
ditional fourteen cases. Of the seven cases involving
confessions, one occurred after conviction. Two of the
confessions were attributed by Borchard to improper
questioning by police. In 20 of the cases the errors
were uncovered by substantiated confessions of others.
Id. at xiii-xix.
Of the 18 cases of erroneous conviction briefly
described by Frank and Frank, Ch. 7, none involved
confessions, but in 12, the solution was aided by con-
fession of others.
"People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill.2d 41, 190 N.E.2d 825
(1963).
new constitutional basis assigned by it for its de-
cision.
Constitutional Applications
The first reversal of a state case because of ad-
mission of a coerced confession occurred in 1936.18
At least as early as 1941 it became evident that the
Court was not exclusively concerned with trust-
worthiness in imposing a constitutional standard.
Lisenba v. California9 sustained a California con-
viction for murder. The Court, through Justice
Roberts, stated:
"The aim of the requirement of due process
is not to exclude presumptively false evidence,
but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the
use of evidence, whether true or false. The
criteria for decision of that question may differ
from those appertaining to a State's rule as to
the admissibility of a confession.
20
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee" the Lisenba dictum
that the constitutional test was not one merely of
trustworthiness was applied to reverse a convic-
tion in which a confession obtained after 36 hours
of semi-continuous questioning had been received
in evidence. The Court held that the police conduct
had been "inherently coercive" without explaining
the principle applied. Justice Jackson in dissent
protested that the Court had failed to determine
whether the confession was in fact coerced and had
ignored evidence indicating that the confession
had been given under circumstances indicating
that Ashcraft was in full control of his faculties at
the time of the confession."
In spite of decisions such as Lisenba and
Ashcraft, which appeared to announce a broader
exclusionary rule, as recently as Stein v. New York2
the Court, through Mr. Justice Jackson, spoke as
though the principle to be applied was still one
based upon the desire to prevent conviction upon
unreliable evidence:
"Coerced confessions are not more stained
with illegality than other evidence obtained in
violation of law .... [R]eliance on a coerced
confession vitiates a conviction because such
17 378 U.S. 478, 484, n.4. The possibility of attempt-
ing to deal with improper inducement of confessions
by law enforcement officers by preserving more evi-
dence relating to the circumstances under which they
were obtained is briefly discussed infra, pp. 430-431.
18 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
19 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
20 id. at 236.
21322 U.S. 143 (1944).
22 Id. at 156-174.
346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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a confession combines the persuasiveness of
apparent conclusiveness with what judicial ex-
perience shows to be illusory and deceptive
ev id en ce . ,,A 
: I .I,
Stein sustained the practice followed in New York
and a number of other jurisdictions under which a
trial judge left to the jury the decision of whether
a confession was "voluntary," the Court merely
making a preliminary finding that a jury could
properly so determine. The jury was instructed not
to consider the confession in the event they deemed
it coerced. The rule in Stein thus presented no
difficulty so long as the rationale of exclusion was
lack of trustworthiness; it did, however, create
dangers that a jury might give weight to a con-
fession (that is, believe it to be truthful) even
though they believed it to have been obtained by
coercive means.
Stein was followed by widespread changes in the
personnel of the Court. A few months after the de-
cision Chief Justice Warren replaced Chief Justice
Vinson, and the following year Justice Jackson,
the leader of the group of justices who subscribed
to something close to a trustworthiness test died,
being succeeded by Justice Harlan. In 1956 Justice
Brennan replaced Justice Minton, and two years
later Justice Stewart followed Justice Burton.
While the most decisive abandonment of previous
criteria applied to confession cases was to await
the later retirement of Justice Frankfurter-who
had himself played a leading role in the attack on
in-custody interrogation methods, particularly in
federal courts-the alteration in attitude was soon
visible. 5
Rogers v. Richmond 6 applied the coup de grace to
the orthodox principle of exclusion. After the de-
fendant had been arrested and questioned for
several hours without success, the police stated
that they were going to have his wife taken into
custody for questioning. The defendant then con-
24
1d. at 192. Professor Paulsen has argued that the
Court went beyond the trustworthiness rationale even
in Stein, which indicated that the admission of a con-
fession coerced by physical violence or threat of it
would vitiate a conviction as being too untrustworthy.
Paulsen pointed out that even such a confession may
be corroborated and found to be reliable. Thus, he
contended, the opinion is not fully supportable on
the trustworthiness principle. See Paulsen, The Four-
teenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN L.
REv. 441, 428 (1954), See also Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1,
12 (1956); cf. Wigmore On Evidence §§856-859 (3d
ed. 1940).
25 E.g., see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
26 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
fessed. The Connecticut courts admitted the con-
fession on the theory that the confession was vol-
untary in that the circumstances were not such
as to make likely an untruthful admission of guilt.
The Supreme Court unanimously was of the view
that this standardwag constitutionally impermis-
sible.
The final blow to the trustworthiness standard
was the formal repudiation of the Stein rule. This
was accomplished in Jackson v. Denno,27 the Court
stating that Stein had been based on a reliability
test, which had been rejected in Rogers 8
Thus it has become fully apparent that the
Court in excluding confessions has not been solely
-or perhaps even primarily-concerned with safe-
guarding the truth-seeking process. Other values
are involved. An attempt must be made to consider
them.
II. REQuIRxsrNTs OF THE
CoNsTrruTIoN ITSELF
This article will not attempt a detailed re-
examination of the origins of the fifth and sixth
amendments or of their interpretation. The propo-
sition submitted is a modest one: neither the words
of the Constitution, its background, nor its essen-
tial policies requires wholesale rejection of con-
fessions.
The language of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution does not compel
general exclusion of confessions. Neither do their
histories.
The privilege against self-incrimination at com-
mon law did not apply to situations where there
was no official right to compel answers and hence
did not apply to police questioning.29 The con-
fession rule came into existence a century after the
origins of the privilege against self-incrimination."
While the Supreme Court in 1897 stated by way of
dictum that the prohibition against coerced con-
fessions was controlled by the fifth amendment, 3'
the decision resulted in much criticism and was not
followed in succeeding cases.n
Z 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
28 Id. at 383-4.
29 8 WIoGoRE ON EVIDENCE §2252; (McNaugh. Rev.
1961); Morgan, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination,
34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 18 (1949); cf. Comment, The Privi-
lege against Self-Incrimination: Does it Exist in the Po-
lice Station? 5 STAN L. REV. 459 (1953).
3 8 WrGuoRE oN EVIDENCE §2266 (McNaugh. Rev.
1961).
31 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 533, 542.
273 WiGMoRE ON EVIDENCE §822, n.2, §823, n.5
3d ed. 1940); BEIsEL, CoNoL OVER ILLEGAL EN-
FORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE OF THE
SuPrumuE CoURT 86-90 (1955).
[Vol. 56
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The distinction between the privilege and the
coerced confession rule was carefully noted in the
first case constitutionally imposing the latter upon
the states as a matter of due process of law.- Due
process was held to proscribe the admission into
evidence of a coerced confession, although at the
time, the privilege against self-incrimination was
not itself included within the fourteenth amend-
ment protections.3 Nevertheless more recent de-
cisions broadening the scope of the involuntary
confession rule to cover admissions which would
not be barred on a lack of trustworthiness basis
adopt policies also served by the privilege against
self-incrimination. Furthermore, .. dicta in con-
temporary opinions of the Court indicate an in-
clination to rescue the notion that the privilege
extends to police investigations.
In Malloy v. Hogan35 the Court reversed a con-
tempt conviction of a witness before a state judicial
proceeding who declined to testify on grounds of
self-incrimination. The Court based its argument
in part on the state coerced confession cases which
had been reversed under the fourteenth amend-
ment, stating that those decisions, in ruling out
statements secured with mild inducements, a
fortiori would not permit a state to obtain in-
criminating admissions under threat of imprison-
ment.3" The confession rule is applicable to situa-
tions where the process of questioning itself is
subject to greater danger of abuse of the suspect,
since the proceedings are usually secret, the per-
sonnel frequently more poorly trained, the suspect
is not represented by counsel, and there is no im-
partial arbiter of the proceeding. In these respects,
if there is an a fortiori argument, it must be made
the other way, as indeed, it frequently has.n
In view of the broad coverage of the existing
confession doctrine the matter might seem to be
largely academic. However it is not at all academic
if, by extending the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination to confessions situations, the
Court will now require a showing of informed and
purposeful waiver of the privilege. There is a hint
in Escobedo that it may have this in mind: "The
accused may, of course, intelligently and knowingly
waive his privilege against self-incrimination ...",,
Under such an approach, confessions traditionally
deemed to have been voluntarily made to police
3 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936).
34Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
35 378 U.S. 1 (1964).36Id. at 7.
3 See infra, pp. 421-424.
36 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14.
or even to private persons may hereafter be ex-
cludable. The fifth amendment requirement of no
compulsion, would, in effect, be replaced by a re-
quirement of a showing of "intelligent and know-
ing" waiver. Such a result could not be attributed
to the Constitution itself.
From the time of the adoption of the sixth
amendment to 1932 there were almost no cases,
either federal or state, on the right to counsel. The
English background is uncertain, although it ap-
pears that the right to be assisted even by retained
counsel in felony cases (other than treason) was
not fully recognized until 1836.31 The modern
federal constitutional law of right to counsel was
inaugurated with Powell v. Alabamna,40 holding that
in capital cases the states were required to provide
counsel for assistance at trial, with sufficient ad-
vance notice for preparation for trial. The right to
other than retained counsel at trial in non-capital
felony cases was not established in the federal
courts until 1938,41 or in the state courts until
1963 . 2 The question of whether it was constitu-
tionally permissible for a state to admit a con-
fession obtained after refusal to permit a defendant
to consult with his lawyer came before the Supreme
Court in two cases in 1958. It was answered in the
negative. 3 While these cases were probably over-
ruled by Rscobedo,4 the reach of the right to counsel
in investigative situations remains to be clarified
by further decisions.
It is sometimes urged that the right of a suspect
to remain quiet during police questioning being
conceded, the encouragement of his exercise of that
right by means of a vigorous privilege against self-
incrimination and an extended right to counsel
should not be protested. 45 However, it is one thing
for society to establish a policy of not applying
coercive sanctions against behavior and quite
another for society to urge it. For example, one
may grant a "right" to kill to prevent the escape of
a felon without promoting its exercise whenever
possible. If indeed there is a social interest in trying
criminal cases on their facts, although an interest
39 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932);
Note, An Historical Argunent for the Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1018-
1034 (1964).
40 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
41 ohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.
4 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335.
43 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433; Cicenia v.
LaGay, 357 U.S. 504.
"See 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
41 See Note, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 79
Harv. L. Rev. 143, 221 (1964).
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which we have decided to be outweighed by an in-
terest in avoiding coercive treatment of suspects, it
does not follow that the former interest is to be
disregarded in the absence of actual coercion.
46 It
is obvious that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and the right to counsel can be applied so as
to have a highly restrictive effect upon the obtain-
ing of confession evidence. Whether they should
be cannot be resolved in their own terms, but re-
quire independent assessments.
III. DETERRENCE OF ILLEGAL OR UNDESIRABLE
POLICE CONDUCT
It has sometimes been thought that the princi-
ple to be served by exclusion of confessions is the
deterrence of the third degree47 and other unlawful
or undesired police conduct. The situation thus
would be analogous to the common justification of
the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search and seizure under the rule of Mapp v.
Ohio.48
While there is undoubtedly an element of de-
terrent thinking in many of the confession cases,
the principle is intelligible only if we understand
what we are trying to deter.
16Compare DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
IN ENGLAND 48-50 (1960):
I have said that the accused's statement to the
police often plays a great part in the prosecution's
case....
How do I reconcile what I have said with the ac-
cused's right to silence? Does not the English system
pride itself on having nothing to do with those in-
quisitorial methods which are said to be practised on
the Continent and are designed to get the accused to
convict himself out of his own mouth?...
The answer to these questions is that while the
English System undoubtedly does give the accused
man the right to say nothing, it does nothing to urge
him to take advantage of his right or even to make
that course invariably the attractive one....
4 According to Wigmore, the "third degree" origi-
nally meant the use of violence. It has been frequently
extended to include non-violent interrogation, par-
ticularly by continuous questioning over an extended
period of time. 3 WIomoRE ON EVIDENCE §851 (3d ed.
1940). The Wickersham Commission defined it as the
"employment of methods which inflict suffering,
physical or mental, upon a person in order to obtain
information about a crime." NATIONAL COMMsi. ON
LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT No.
11, LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 19 (1931).
48367 U.S. 643 (1961). ". . . [Tlhe purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for
the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it' .... " Id. at 656. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965). Professor Paulsen, writing over a
decade ago, seems to have taken this position with
respect to the exclusion of confessions, to the extent
the principle went beyond the requirements of re-
liability. See Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and
the Third Degree, 6 STAN L. REV. 411 (1954).
There is surely a consensus that the Court should
act to prevent the utilization of physical torture, as
was involved in the 1936 case of Brown v. Missis-
sippi;49 yet there have been no state cases before
the Supreme Court in which a finding of violence
was made since that time.50 There is also probably
a consensus with respect to outrageous physical
indignity such as that occurring in Malinsky v. New
York. 5' One would expect that there is also a con-
sensus on cases of very prolonged incommunicado
interrogation.5 The same may be said for threats of
harm or promises of benefit which present any sub-
stantial likelihood of producing false statements,u
although such exclusions are also fully justifiable
on the trustworthiness of evidence rationale. The
deterrence argument is relevant when the con-
fession at issue was obtained as a result of an il-
legal search and/or an illegal arrest, although it is
not yet clear whether a majority of the Court is
willing to apply an exclusionary sanction in the
case of confessions obtained after any illegal arrest
irrespective of the circumstances.4
The problem of defining what we are trying to
deter becomes an extremely difficult one, however,
when the standard applied is whether the practices
of the police "offend what may fairly be deemed
the civilized standards of the Anglo-American
world,"5 or where the conduct of the police indi-
cates "disregard of the standards of decency."'"
While Justice Frankfurter defended similar due
process standards against the objection that they
are predicated on concepts of natural law and in
fact provide no standard for judgment, 57 Justices
Black and Douglas have, on occasion, respectively
found them "evanescent"' ' and "dependent upon
the idiosyncrasies of judges."
5 9
Recent decisions indicate that whatever the
nature of the uncivilized standards, it is not now
49 297 U.S. 278.
50 See Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subse-
quent Developments in Cases Reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH.
& LEE L. REv., 202 (1962).
51324 U.S. 401 (1945) (defendant required to re-
main without clothing for extended period of time);
see also, Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 533 (1897).
12 E.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
53 E.g., Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).54 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1962). (Statement made after illegal search followed
by illegal arrest inadmissable.)
51 Fikes v. Alabama 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
11 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948) (opinion
of Douglas, J.
51 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1951).
58 Id. at 177.
59 Id. at 179.
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required that they be such as to "shock the con-
science." 60 For example, in Haynwe v. Washington"'
the defendant having already orally confessed to a
robbery, was told that he could telephone his wife
only after he "cooperated" in reducing the state-
ment to writing. This he did, and the statement
was admitted at the trial. The Court held the con-
iession involuntary and reversed the conviction.
However, the case most dramatically inconsist-
ent with a deterrent rationale is Massiah v. United
States.62 In replying to the Solicitor General's
argument that the Narcotics Bureau was justified
in continuing its investigation into the criminal ac-
tivities of the group of which defendant was a
member, even after the defendant's indictment,
the Court stated:
"We may accept and, at least for present
purposes, completely approve all that this ar-
gument implies, Fourth Amendment problems
to one side. We do not question that in this
case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper
to continue an investigation of the suspected
criminal activities of the defendant and his
alleged confederates, even though the de-
fendant had already been indicted. All that we
hold is that the defendant's own incriminating
statements, obtained by federal agents under
the circumstances here disclosed, could not
constitutionally be used by the prosecution as
evidence against him at his trial."
' '
It seems clear that the Court's decision, in which
six members joined, cannot be supported on a de-
terrent theory. To be sure, deception at the in-
stigation of the government was involved, but this
is a necessary concomitant of all undercover opera-
tions. More fundamentally, the Court did not
predicate its decision on such deception in im-
munizing the defendant from its effects. The Court
appears to accept the propriety of the further in-
vestigation itself.
To the extent that deterrence of the third degree
or other undesired conduct by the police does play
a role in exclusionary principles, an evaluation
would have to seek to determine its efficacy. Un-
fortunately, here as elsewhere opinions are more
easily discovered than fact. A pessimistic indica-
tion is a study of cases in a branch of the Chicago
Municipal Court during the year 1950. In 4,673
out of 6,649 cases the defendant challenged the
The phrase is from id. at 172.
6373 US. 503 (1963).
377 U.S. 201 (1964). The decision is summarized
supra p. 1.
Id. at 206-207 (Emphasis in original.)
legality of the method of obtaining evidence. In
4,593 of these cases the Court suppressed the evi-
dence. It should be noted that the cases heard by
the Chicago Municipal Court involved the mis-
demeanor of gambling. The degree of deterrence
may be greater in felony cases, as the police interest
in successful prosecution rather than harassment
may be increased. The Chicago experience may
also be atypical.
65
In the area of confessions the exclusionary rules
are utilized, not by all persons subjected to police
interrogation, but only by those who are charged
and who decide to contest their cases. In a study of
arrests for investigation made by the police of the
District of Columbia in the years 1960 and 1961
only about 6% of the persons thus arrested were
actually charged.
66
Even if all confessions were inadmissible, police
would have motives for interrogating suspects in
order to get leads to extrinsic evidence, to gain in-
telligence about crimes, as well as a sanction in
itself.6
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume
that a desire of criminal investigators to see their
work bear fruition in convictions would lead to
some negation of interrogation practices which are
held to be illegal. Assuming this to be the case,
some unmeasured and probably unmeasurable
deterrent effect may be obtained.
IV. EQUALITARIANISM AMONG
POTEITIAL DEFENDANTS
It cannot be denied that confession is almost in-
variably inconsistent with the interest of a suspect
A Note, Searches and Seizures in Illinois: Enforce-
onent of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw.
U.L. REv. 493, 497-499 (1952).
61 See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later:
Illegal State Evidewe in State and Federal Courts, 43
MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1157, n.250 (1959).
66 District of Columbia Committee on Police Ar-
rests for Investigation, Report and Recommendations
(1962); See Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the
Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952).
67 See MAGUIRE, EViDENCE OF GUST §4.002 (1959);
LAFAVE, ARREST, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION'S SURVEY OF TE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNID STATES 438-489
(1965). "This Court may, by the adoption of such a
rule, outlaw confessions. But the police will not abandon
their practice of questioning suspects after arrest and
before arraignment. And not because of any disrespect
for this Court and its teachings, but simply because
society will not let them, because society cannot let
them. The 'deeply rooted feelings of the community'
will demand that those who murder and rape and
would escape unknown-but for the confession follow-
ing arrest-be at least unmasked though they may go
unwhipped of justice." Brief for Respondent, p. 43,
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478(1964).
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seeking to avoid criminal prosecution and convic-
tion. While the factors that lead persons to confess
are undoubtedly extremely complex and imper-
fectly understood, it is an easy inference that per-
sons guilty of such a tactical blunder must be in-
tellectually, emotionally, ethnically, or culturally
,disadvantaged. In a famous early confession case
involving protracted interrogation, Justice Black
mildly wrote for the Court:
"The determination to preserve an accused's
right to procedural due process sprang in large
part from knowledge of the historical truth
that the rights and liberties of people accused
of crime could not be safely entrusted to secret
inquisitorial processes. The testimony of cen-
turies, in governments of varying kinds over
populations of different races and beliefs, stood
as proof that physical and mental torture and
coercion had brought about the tragically un-
just sacrifices of some who were the noblest
and most useful of their generations. The rack,
the thumbscrew, the wheel, solitary confine-
ment, protracted questioning and cross ques-
tioning, and other ingenious forms of entrap-
ment of the helpless or unpopular had left their
wake of mutilated bodies and shattered minds
along the way to the cross, the guillotine, the
stake and the hangman's noose. And they who
have suffered most from secret and dictatorial
proceedings have almost always been the poor,
the ignorant, the numerically weak, the friend-
less, and the powerless."0 8
Professor Beisel adds:
"Seldom indeed do we hear of professionally
trained men or experienced business men mak-
ing confessions as to crimes of which they
might be accused. Instead, under the present
constitutional law of 'coerced' confessions, it
is the frightened, the insecure, the weak, the
untrained, the bewildered, the stupid, the
naive, the credulous that are caught in the
web. These are the ones who will talk to an
experienced, well-trained police interrogator.
Once they start talking, they talk themselves
into jail.... No matter how fine we may think
the present constitutional law of confessions
to be, it does permit many of the discrimina-
tory features of characteristics dividing and
separating men into various social classes to-
day to play an important, perhaps decisive,
yet unarticulated, role in determining who
6S Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 at 237-238
(1940)-
shall or shall not be punished by the use of con-
fessions. All the inequalities of native intelli-
gence, environment, schooling, economic op-
portunity, racial origin, to name only a few,
bear upon and are allowed to play an impor-
tant part in securing confessions of guilt at
the police station under the present constitu-
tional law of 'coerced' confessions." 69
The argument surely has emotional appeal. It
would be incautious to assert that it may not have
legal consequence as well in an age of advancing
constitutional equalitarianism. 70 Relying primarily
upon the equal protection clause, the Supreme
Court has held that the states must take affirma-
tive action to remedy inequality resulting from
poverty during litigation itself, e.g., as in providing
appellate transcripts7' and counselU2 Gideon v.
Wainwrigh 3 while decided in terms of due process,
has strong equalitarian motifs.74 If the dull witted,
the ignorant, the impulsive, the guilt-ridden are
disadvantaged in the criminal process by improvi-
dent confession should not the legal system also
attempt to provide a remedy? Is it not unfair to
take advantage of such weakness?
In Escobedo the Court came close to indicating
an affirmative answer to these questions: ".... If
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system. 5
Taking this language for all it may be worth, it
69 BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT
OF TE CRIMINAL LAW: Role of the Supreme Court
105-106 (1955). Note, An Historical Argument for
the Right to Counsel during Police Interrogation, 73
Yale L. J. 1000, 1044 (1964) appears to make the
same assumption. Empirical data is not cited for the
notion that the economically or intellectually fortunate
do not confess as readily when questioned as those less
favored in these qualities, and the writer knows of
none. To the extent the former may confess less fre-
quently because of a lower incidence of criminality
the argument seems to prove too much, assuming we
are unwilling, for example, to abolish the law of theft
because its impact is primarily on the poor. A conclu-
sion that experienced criminals rarely confess seems
to have a common sense plausibility, and is probably
borne out in the case of professionals engaged in enter-
prises such as gambling and vice. It is doubtfully
valid as to habitual sociopathic offenders. See gen-
erally, CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANiTY (2d ed. 1950).
70 See Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and
Equal in Tilli to the Legislative and Executive Branches
of the Government," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 143-149
(1964).
71 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
72 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
73 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring that states provide
trial counsel for the indigent in felony cases).
7 Id. at 344.
71 378 U.S. 478 at 490 (1964).
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could be inferred that no confession would be ad-
missible unless the suspect were advised not only of
his right to remain silent, but also of the practical
and tactical consequences of any statement. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that
Escobedo himself had extensively consulted coun-
sel prior to confession. The Court emphasized that
there was no evidence in the record that they
specifically discussed what Escobedo should do in
the event that his codefendant made a false accusa-
tion that he had fired the fatal bulletsYl This, too,
may be interpreted as requiring the tactical assist-
ance of counsel. Yet in view of the careful stating
of the holding, and in view of the more limited
nature of the factual context of the case, the matter
must be regarded as still undecided.
The basic inadequacy of the equalitarian argu-
ment, it is submitted, is that it misconceives the
nature of the problem. Surely it does not follow
that because skilled burglars carefully wipe their
fingerprints off safe dials, that society must outlaw
the use of all fingerprint evidence lest there be dis-
criminatory utilization of such evidence against
the "poor, the ignorant, the numerically weak, the
friendless, and the powerless." It surely will not do
to argue that because some clever or wealthy crimi-
nals avoid conviction that all should do soY7 The
lack of professionalism of many of those engaged in
criminal conduct is a resource which society should
be able to utilize. There seems to be no justifiable
end in equal acquittal of the guilty 8
V. Tim ADvERSARY SYSTEu-EQuALITARIuANIS
BETWEEN PRosEcUTIoN AND DEFENSE
The analogy of the adversary system as it exists
in the courtroom has been referred to in a number
of decisions reaching conclusions that interrogation
76 Id. at 485.
77 See Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect:
Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49
MnN. L. REv. 47, 65 (1964).
78 It is perhaps significant that the opinions of the
Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956), and
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-358 (1963)
are couched in due process as well as equal protection
terms, although the latter is given primary emphasis.
The Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, has said recently, "But I
never understood why the gangster should be made
the model and all others raised, in the name of equality,
to his level of success in suppressing evidence. This is
simply the proposition that if some can beat the rap,
all must beat the rap. I see no reason to distort the
whole of the criminal process in this fashion. Because
we cannot solve all crimes and convict all criminals
is no reason to release those guilty whom we can con-
vict." The Bazelon-Katzenbacl Letters, 56 J. Clu. L., C.
& P. S. 498 (1965).
procedures in those cases fell below due process
standards. In Ashcraft v. Tennessee7 9 the Court
stated:
"We think a situation such as that here
shown by uncontradicted evidence is so in-
herently coercive that its very existence is ir-
reconcilable with the possession of mental
freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full
coercive force is brought to bear. It is incon-
ceivable that any court of justice in the land,
conducted as our courts are, open to the pub-
lic, would permit prosecutors serving in relays
to keep a defendant witness under continuous
cross-examination for thirty-six hours without
rest or sleep in an effort to extract a 'volun-
tary' confession. Nor can we, consistently with
Constitutional due process of law, hold volun-
tary a confession where prosecutors do the
same thing away from the restraining influ-
ences of a public trial in an open court room."80
Justice Stewart, concurring in Spano v. New
York, 81 put the matter dramatically:
"Our Constitution guarantees the assist-
ance of counsel to a man on trial for his life in
an orderly courtroom, presided over by a
judge, open to the public, and protected by all
the procedural safeguards of the law. Surely a
Constitution which promises that much can
vouchsafe no less to the same man under mid-
night inquisition in the squad room of a police
station.""2
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion joined
by Justices Black and Brennan, wrote in similar
vein.y Justice Stewart had an opportunity to in-
corporate this view into the majority opinion in
Massiah v. United States.8' He took advantage
of it.8,
Similarly, in 1962 Justice Douglas wrote the
opinion of the Court in Gallegos v. Colorado,86
a case presenting a strikingly equalitarian ra-
tionale. The defendant was a fourteen year old
boy who had been convicted of murder. He had
confessed while in juvenile custody prior to the
death of the victim. In holding that the admission
of the confession violated due process the Court
stated:" .. . A lawyer or an adult relative or friend
79 322 U.S. 143 (1944).80 Id. at 154 (footnotes omitted).
81360 U.S. 315 (1959).
Id. at 327.
83Id. at 424-426.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).85 Id. at 204.
86 370 U.S. 49.
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could have given the petitioner the protection
which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice
would have put him on a less unequal footing with
his interrogators .... 7
A closely related view is contained in frequent
assertion that American criminal justice is accusa-
torial rather than inquisitorial in nature. This lan-
guage may be traced to Watts v. Indiana,8s a case
involving extensive detention and interrogation of
the accused, in which Justice Frankfurter wrote for
the Court:
"To turn the detention of an accused into a
process of wrenching from him evidence which
could not be extorted in open court with all its
safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the power of
arrest as to offend the procedural standards of
due process.
This is so because it violates the underlying
principle in our enforcement of the criminal
law. Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the
inquisitorial system. Such has been the char-
acteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice
since it freed itself from practices borrowed by
the Star Chamber from the Continent whereby
an accused was interrogated in secret for hours
on end. ... Under our system society carries
the burden of proving its charge against the
accused not out of his own mouth. It must es-
tablish its case, not by interrogation of the ac-
cused even under judicial safeguards, but by
evidence independently secured through skill-
ful investigation. . ... 89
Of course the statement that the adversary sys-
tem characterized investigatory stages of the
criminal case simply was not true.90 Justice
Frankfurter himself recognized this in his opinion
in Culombe v. Connecticut.
91
"Despite modern advances in the technol-
ogy of crime detection, offenses frequently oc-
cur about which things cannot be made to
speak. And where there cannot be found inno-
cent human witnesses to such offenses, nothing
remains-if police investigation is not to be
balked before it has fairly begun-but to seek
out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them
questions, witnesses, that is, who are suspected
87 Id. at 54.
88338 U.S. 49 k1949).
89 Id. at 54.
90 See 3 WIGoM o'zN EVIDENCE §§817-820 (3d ed.
1940); Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From
Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAL. L. REv. 11, 16-18
(1962).
91367 U.S. 568 (1961).
of knowing something about the offense pre-
cisely because they are suspected of implica-
tion in it.
... In any event, whatever its outcome,
such questioning is often indispensable to
crime detection. Its compelling necessity has
been judicially recognized as its sufficient justi-
fication, even in a society which, like ours,
stands strongly and constitutionally com-
mitted to the principle that persons accused
of crime cannot be made to convict themselves
out of their own mouths."
Whether the typical use of questioning of sus-
pects in the investigative stage of a case is char-
acterized as "inquisitorial" seems to depend on
whether the writer disapproves of the practice and
desires to argue his position with emotive lan-
guage-'
The question of importance is not whether there
is a difference between the trial process and the in-
vestigative process, but whether the difference is
justified. It is submitted that it is. The adversary
system at the time of preparation for trial and trial,
including making available assistance of counsel,
serves to collect and present evidence and law
relevant to the resolution of the dispute. The de-
cision in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 was without dis-
sent. It required substantial change in practice in
only four of the states.95 The adversary system,
however, functions differently during the investi-
gation of a case, particularly during the questioning
of suspects. The adversary system during the ques-
tioning of suspects functions to suppress evidence
in the case of the guilty, rather than to present it.
Counsel at such a proceeding serves not only to
prevent abusive questioning techniques, but to
prevent all questioning.
This is not a matter of a suspect being advised
of his constitutional rights. Counsel's primary func-
tion is surely not to advise the client that he is
under no obligation to speak. Counsel's job is to
give him tactical advice not to speak.9 6
9 Id. at 571. (Emphasis supplied.)
11 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 60 (1948).
(Concurring opinion of Jackson, J.)
94372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that due process
required the availability of defense counsel at the
trial of felony cases).
11 See Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1015 (1964).
98 ".... no competent counsel will allow his client
to confess (especially would this be true in the case of
appointed counsel whose failings are laid to the state),
if only to avoid the ever increasing risk of having his
competency attacked on another day and in another
forum ..... Brief for Respondent, pp. 40-41, Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478(1964). See also Enker & Elsen,
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It is true that since the large scale abandonment
of the common law principle that evidence was not
to be excluded, if relevant, on the basis that it was
obtained by illegal means, defense counsel has a
significant role to play in seeking to suppress evi-
dence at the trial. Whether this role should be ex-
panded to prevent the collection of evidence prior
to trial-or more precisely, how far it should be
expanded-remains open however.
It should be noted that immediately after the
commission of the crime the perpetrator normally is
in possession of extensive information concerning
it. Frequently there are no innocent witnesses.
Even when this is not the case, the witnesses may
have imperfectly perceived the event, particularly
when the offense was a violent one, or be unable to
accurately recall it. Many will be unwilling to come
forward to testify. Fingerprints are rarely re-
coverable.
Furthermore, it is almost invariably insufficient
to show merely that a person accused of a serious
crime committed the criminal act. There must be
proof of criminal intent. Did the accused kill the
deceased out of malice or in self defense? Did the
accused take the vehicle with the intent to deprive
the owner of its possession permanently or did he
take it merely for a ride? Or did he believe that the
owner consented to his use of it? Was the accused's
presence in the building accompanied by burglar-
ous intent, or was he engaged in a mere trespass?
The answers to such questions are frequently
known only to the perpetrators of the crimes. It
surely is not obvious that the adversary system and
notions of equalitarianism should be extended to
secure the continuation of this situation in status
quo. Justification for such an extension must be
found in terms other than the adversary system
itself.
VI. PRIVACY AND THE DIGNrY
OF THE INDIVIDUAL
While the interest in individual privacy is pri-
marily protected by the fourth amendment pro-
hibition against unreasonable search and seizures,
a close relationship to a broadly conceived privilege
against self-incrimination has been frequently
noted.0 Perhaps the gravest interference with this
Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Mum. L. REv., 47, 66(1964);
Cf. Herman, The Suprenme Court and Restrictions on
Police Interrogation, 25 Omo ST. L. J. 449, 498(1964).
9 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (opinion
of the Court) and 661-666 (concurring opinion of
Justice Black) (1961).
interest in privacy occurs when an arrest is made
for purposes of interrogation in the absence of
probable cause. 91 An intermediate situation is
frequently presented when the police have suffi-
cient evidence to constitute probable cause for an
arrest but insufficient basis to justify the filing of a
formal charge. 99 Assuming a case in which there is
sufficient reason to justify an arrest, or assuming
questioning in the absence of an arrest, do interests
in privacy and individual dignity preclude ques-
tioning?
At the outset it must be observed that such con-
cepts are not unlike notions of "civilized conduct"
in that they tend to depend on individual attitudes
and values. Yet conventionally we have not
thought that such interests prevent the putting of
questions to witnesses and even suspects, in the
absence of very prolonged interrogation or other
abusive practices. We have, for example, even per-
mitted grand jury subpoenas for witnesses and sus-
pects.
Furthermore, there is evidence which suggests
that the amount of time ordinarily required to in-
terrogate a suspect is surprisingly short. A study in
the District of Columbia °00 indicated that in 1960,
of 172 persons arrested for investigation and sub-
sequently charged 87 were charged after one hour
or less and all except 7 were charged in under 12
hours. In 1961 of 138 persons arrested for investi-
gation and subsequently charged the charge was
filed in all but 10 cases within 8 hours or less.
A study of arrest and interrogation practices in
California in two unidentified medium sized cities
showed a range of interrogation times which varied
between no interrogation and eight hours. The
median in each case was between one and two
hours.10t
Bentham long ago observed in the context of the
98 Cf. Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52
Nw. U.L. Rev. 16 (1958); District of Columbia Com-
mittee on Arrests for Investigation, Report and
Recommendations (1962); La Fave, Arrest (1965)
Ch. 16; compare Barrett, Police Practices and the
Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAL. L.
REv. 47-50 (1962), (indicating situations where it is
argued that detention in the absence of probable cause
to charge is justified).
91 See LA FAVE, ARREST (1965) Chs. 15, 17; Kamisar
and Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Mime.
L. REv. 1, 49 (1963) (indicating this situation to be
quite common).
100 District of Columbia Committee on Police Ar-
rests for Investigation, Report and Recommendations
(1962). See Barrett, op. cit. infra. n. 134 at 35-45.
101 Escobedo confessed after approximately 11 hours
of interrogation. Brief for Respondent, p. 1.
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privilege against self-incrimination that the hard-
ship involved in obtaining evidence of guilt from
the suspect himself was essentially the hardship of
the eventual punishment rather than the interroga-
tion.
"What, then, is the hardship of a man's
being thus made to criminate himself? The
same as that of his being punished: the same
in kind, but inferior in degree: inferior, in as
far as, in the chance of an evil, there is less
hardship than in the certainty of it. Suppose,
in both cases, conviction to be the result: does
it matter to a man, would he give a pin to
choose, whether it is out of his own mouth
that the evidence is to come, or out of
another's?"102
Those familiar with background investigations
involving detailed probing of the subject's prior
activities, friendships, and associations may realize
that alternative means of investigation can im-
pinge more harshly on notions of dignity of the in-
dividual and privacy than direct questioning of
suspects. Questioning also appears to be more pro-
tective of individual privacy than is infiltration of
groups suspected of criminality by persons acting
in cooperation with police.
It must be remembered that interests in indi-
vidual dignity and privacy are threatened not only
by police interrogation but by the incidence of
crime in our society as well. A country in which the
city of Baltimore is said to have a higher homicide
rate than the entire United Kingdom, 10 3 cannot
consider these values to be jeopardized by the
possibility of police intrusion alone. Unless notions
of the absolute importance of freedom from official
inquiry are felt to be so supremely important as to
preclude limitation in terms of competing needs of
a highly interdependent society, the necessity for
attempting to strike a balance and to decide how
much privacy is to be sought to be protected by the
law of confessions remains.
VII. TIE INTEREST OF DEFENDANTS
IN AVOIDING CoNvIcroN
It is a thesis of this article that the reach of cur-
rent confession exclusion doctrines can be justified
only in terms of protecting the interests of guilty
defendants desiring to avoid conviction. Such a
rationale has a long history. It will be recalled that
i02 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, 230-231
(1827).
103 Meyer, Farewell to Washington, New Statesman,
April 2, 1965, p. 564, col. 3.
the privilege against self-incrimination itself arose
in England at a time when compulsory answers to
judicial inquiries were required to enforce sub-
stantive law proscribing political and religious
nonconformity.101 It should not be surprising that
a nation reacting to evidence of gross abuses of
police powers by contemporary totalitarian states,
and which is developing greater sensitivity to
racial, economic, and other group tensions at home,
would be inclined to adopt procedures tending to
grant freedom to the suspect.
Nor is it unlikely that the frequent gulf between
substantive criminal law and common behavior was
without effect. Professor Louis B. Schwartz has ob-
served:
"Kinsey has tabulated our extensive sexual
misdeeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue is
the great archive of our false swearing and
cheating. The highway death statistics in-
adequately record our predilection for man-
slaughter. 100% law enforcement would not
leave enough people at large to build and man
the prisons in which the rest of us would
reside .... ,05
While the argument seems inapposite to many
types of offenses, particularly assaultive ones, with
a little bit of sentiment it may appear to some to
cover the field.
Although again the empirical evidence is not
fully satisfying, the Supreme Court, prior to the
decisions in Massiah and Escobedo, had reason to
believe that substantial restrictions on the utiliza-
tion of evidence obtained from the questioning of
suspects would have an important effect upon the
ability of the states to successfully prosecute crimi-
nal cases. The fact that the Supreme Court's own
experiment with the far less restrictive McNabb-
Mallory rule has not been followed by the states
was itself suggestive. 06 The failure of the courts of
49 states to utilize right to counsel rationales to
exclude confessions was also illuminating107
104 See 8 Wioo ON EvIDENCE, §2250 (McNaugh.
Rev. 1961); MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE or GUILT 12, n.3
(1959).
10 Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire
Tapping, 103 U.PA. L. REv. 157 (1954).
106 Cf. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Pro-
cedures, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16-30 (1953).
107 Apparently the sole exception was the State of
New York, which understandably had been led to
expect new constitutional doctrine by concurring
opinions relying on right to counsel in a case specifically
addressed to itself: Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959). See People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y. 2d, 148, 15
N.E.2d 628 (1963); but see People v. Gunner 193
N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852 (1965).
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True, it has sometimes been asserted that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation functions success-
fully without reliance on confessions comparable to
that of the states, but the radically different nature
of the types of crimes which are the subject of fed-
eral prosecution outside the District of Columbia
has also been noted. 08 There is reason to believe
that restrictions on the use of confessions has its
heaviest impact in cases involving crimes of vio-
lence."0 9 Such offenses are probably foremost in
their disturbance to the community and foremost
in the concern of local law enforcement. Yet here
extrinsic evidence sufficient to convict is often
unavailable. On the other hand, crimes of fraud,
whether state or federal, seem much less dependent
on confessions for their solution. Common exam-
ples are provided by crimes involving the forgery
or uttering of false bank checks, tax frauds, and
mail frauds.
In this connection it may also be observed that
prior to 1964 the Supreme Court wrote opinions in
33 cases in which questions of the admission of
confessions were decided. These cases included 25
of murder, 4 of rape, 2 of robbery, 1 of man-
slaughter, and 1 of narcotics." 0 The significance of
these figures is subject to strong reservation, of
course, because of selective application for and
allowance of Supreme Court review.
The record before the Court has frequently in-
dicated that a case depended for its solution upon
obtaining a confession. Three famous examples
were decided on the same day: Watts v. Indiana,"'
Turner v. Pennsylvania,"' and Harris v. South Caro-
lina.13 Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the first
and dissenting in the latter two, observed:
"These three cases, from widely separated
states, present essentially the same problem.
Its recurrence suggests that it has roots in
some condition fundamental and general to
our criminal system.
In each case police were confronted with one
100 See, e.g., District of Columbia Committee on
Police Arrests for Investigation, Report and Recom-
mendations 50-51 (1962).
109 See Confessions and Police Detention, Hearings
Pursuant to S. Res. 234 [Mallory Rule] Before the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee
on Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-116 (1958).
But see Packer, Policing the Police, The New Republic
17, 20 (Sept. 4, 1965).
010 See Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in
Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 313, 327
(1964).
M 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
' 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
11 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
or more brutal murders which the authorities
were under the highest duty to solve. Each of
these murders was unwitnessed, and the only
positive knowledge on which a solution could
be based was possessed by the killer. In each
there was reasonable ground to suspect an in-
dividual but not enough legal evidence to
charge him with guilt. In each the police at-
tempted to meet the situation by taking the
suspect into custody and interrogating him.
This extended over varying periods. In each,
confessions were made and received in evi-
dence at the trial. Checked with external evi-
dence, they are inherently believable, and were
not shaken as to truth by anything that oc-
curred at the trial. Each confessor was
convicted by a jury and state courts affirmed.
This Court sets all three convictions aside.
The seriousness of the Court's judgment is
that no one suggests that any course held
promise of solution of these murders other
than to take the suspect into custody for ques-
tioning. The alternative was to close the books
on the crime and forget it, with the suspect at
large. This is a grave choice for a society in
which two-thirds of the murders already are
closed out as insoluble.""
4
Some notion of the significance of confessions in
cases which have been taken before the Supreme
Court is given in a review of their subsequent his-
tories. In a study of 22 cases reversed because of
4 Id. at 57-58. See also opinion of Justice Frank-
furter in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
578-580 (1961):
"The critical elements of the problem may be
quickly isolated in light of what has already been
said. Its first pole is the recognition that 'Questioning
suspects is indispensable in law enforcement' ...
But if it is once admitted that questioning of suspects
is permissible, whatever reasonable means are needed
to make the questioning effective must also be con-
ceded to the police. Often prolongation of the interroga-
tion period will be essential, so that a suspect's story
can be checked and, if it proves untrue, he can be
confronted with the lie; if true, released without charge.
Often the place of questioning will have to be a police
interrogation room, both because it is important to
assure the proper atmosphere of privacy and non-
distraction if questioning is to be made productive
and because, where a suspect is questioned but not
taken into custody, he-and in some cases his as-
sociates-may take prompt warning and flee the prem-
ises. Legal counsel for the suspect will generally prove
a thorough obstruction to the investigation. Indeed,
even to inform the suspect of his legal right to keep
silent will prove an obstruction. Whatever fortifies
the suspect or seconds him in his capacity to keep his




coerced confessions and remanded to state courts,
it was reported that 11 of the defendants were con-
victed of the same or of a lesser offense, 10 were
released, and one was murdered by the husband of
the victim of the offense during the third re-trial
of the case.1 5 In a number of these 11 cases the
subsequent convictions were based on pleas of
guilty. Furthermore, the study does not indicate
in how many, if any, of the cases which were re-
tried, confessions, admissions, or the fruits thereof,
were received in evidence."
6
In Escobedo itself the defendant's confession was
the evidence connecting him to the crime."7 It
seems fair to conclude that the Court assumed
that Escobedo's confessed instigation of the homi-
cide could not be proven without his confession." 8
Indeed a consciousness that the court was fur-
thering the interest of guilty defendants in avoiding
conviction in deciding Escobedo is suggested by the
statement toward the end of the majority opinion:
"Nothing we have said today affects the
powers of the police to investigate 'an unsolved
crime,' Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327,
79 S.Ct. 1202, 1209 (Stewart, J., concurring),
by gathering information from witnesses and
by other 'proper investigative efforts,' Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519, 83 S.Ct.
1336, 1346 .... ,9
The Court in Haynes-again recalling that it was
the same majority speaking through the same
justice-had written:
"... And, certainly, we do not mean to sug-
gest that all interrogation of witnesses and sus-
pects is impermissible. Such questioning is un-
"5 Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent
Developments in Cases Reversed by the U.S. Snpreme
Court and Somne Current Problems, 19 WASH. & LE
L. REv. 202, 208-9 (1962).
116 Presumably the confessions ordered excluded
were not received on re-trial. However, it has not
been uncommon for defendants to have made con-
fessions or admissions other than the ones ruled in-
competent by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Malinsky
v. New York 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Haynes v. Washing-
ton, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
117 See People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 42, 190
N.E.2d 825, 826 (1963).
118 After remand the case against Escobedo was
dismissed. Time, April 23, 1965, p. 46, col. 1. (The
inference is further supported by the absence of any
observation comparable to the one by the same ma-
jority of the Court speaking through the same Justice
in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963),
that in that case the argument that interrogation was
needed to solve the case was inapplicable, because of
other evidence there available.)
"' 378 U.S. at 492 (Emphasis added.)
doubtedly an essential tool in effective law en-
forcement .... 120
For a number of years prior to Massiah and
Escobedo the focus of Supreme Court controversy
had been shifting from the question of what con-
stituted a voluntary confession to the question of
whether confessions of any sort should be allowed
in evidence against a defendant. When the balance
struck in earlier cases was before the Court for
reconsideration in Escobedo it had before it a brief
for petitioner which put the argument of the need
of defendants to avoid confessions with unusual
candor:
"The right to counsel, if it is to have any
efficacy at all, must obtain when the need for
the advice of counsel is crucial.... Especially
is this so in the case at bar where the advice
of counsel would have precluded the eliciting
of the statement of petitioner upon which his
conviction was solely based .... ,121
In a brief amicus curiae the American Civil
Liberties Union argued that the position taken in
Crooker and Cicenia (that counsel at the police
station will unduly interfere with criminal investi-
gation and successful prosecution) should be dis-
regarded, because "the variables which can de-
termine the efficiency of criminal investigation and
successful prosecution are so complex that no one
really knows the extent to which seemingly more re-
strictive rules in this area actually do or will
hamper the police....,,
Perhaps more rationally, the A. C. L. U. pointed
out a possible intermediate basis for decision, not-
ing that a denial of a specific request for counsel
may be deemed more coercive than failure to make
counsel available without such a request.in In gen-
eral, however, the amicus brief urged broader
grounds for decision: an end to private police ques-
tioning of arrested persons."'
The brief for the State of Illinois recalled that the
120 373 U.S. 503, 515 (Emphasis added.)
"2 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-9.1 2 Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, p. 15 (Emphasis
added.) Even if the Court were to ignore the interests
of Illinois under the record before it and even if it
were to decide that its own experience and the other
materials available to it were too limited for confident
prediction of the extent of impairment of police func-
tions, one would hope that this would be a reason for
experimenting under the supervisory power exercised
by the Court over the federal system, rather than a
matter for constitutional imposition on the nation as
a whole.
12 Id. at 9.
124 E.g., id. at 11.
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majority of five justices which had reversed the
conviction in Hayes had conceded that the ques-
tioning of suspects was essential to law enforce-
ment. It then argued that allowance of requests for
counsel could hardly be confined to those who have
attorneys, in view of cases such as Gideon and
Griffin v. Illinois."' In addition, the brief for Illi-
nois argued, if criminal defendants are entitled to
counsel from the moment of arrest, such right does
not depend upon a request, in view of the doctrine
of Carnley v. Cochran.Y6 The conclusion would be
the ending of police questioning of suspects even
though conceding its indispensibility to law en-
forcement."2
In the majority opinion in Escobedo the dilemma
was noted and resolved as follows:
"It is argued that if the right to counsel is
afforded prior to indictment, the number of
confessions obtained by the police will di-
minish significantly, because most confessions
are obtained during the period between arrest
and indictment, and 'any lawyer worth his salt
will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to
make no statement to police under any circum-
stances.' Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59,
69 S.Ct. 1347, 1357, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (Jackson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This argument, of course, cuts two ways. The
fact that many confessions are obtained during
this period points up its critical nature as a
'stage when legal aid and advice' are surely
needed.... [Citations omitted.] The right to
Counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a
period when few confessions were obtained.
There is necessarily a direct relationship be-
tween the importance of a stage to the police
in their quest for a confession and the criti-
calness of that stage to the accused in his need
for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some
others, strikes the balance in favor of the right
of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of
his privilege against self-incrimination. See
note, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1048-1051 (1964).""2
Thus the crucial issue 2 9 of adjusting the com-
peting interests of society and the individual sus-
pected of crime was resolved by claiming, in effect,
that the judgment had been made by the Consti-
-5 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
6 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) (Counsel at trial not
waived by failure to make request, in absence of facts
indicating purposeful and informed waiver.)
InBrief for the Respondent, 39-41.
-8 378 U.S. at 488.
2 Professors Kamisar and Choper have referred to
tution, since defendants have a critical need to
avoid making confessions.3 0
Of course it is not here contended that the in-
terest of a guilty accused in avoiding conviction
has now been recognized by a majority of the Court
as sufficient, standing alone, to reverse a convic-
tion. Each case must still present a constitutional
question which is capable of being phrased in con-
ventional terminology. Cases such as Massiah,
however, indicate that the Court approaches the
task of posing such issues with considerable flexi-
bility and ingenuity. Once that is done, the in-
terest of the state in enforcing its criminal law ap-
pears to be largely discounted and the interest of
the defendant to the contrary preferred.
In his Escobedo dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice
White noted that the Court in Massiah had held
that as of the date of the indictment the prosecu-
tion was disentitled to secure admissions from the
accused and that in Escobedo the time was moved
back to when suspicion begins to "focus on the ac-
cused."' 3' There is an important respect, however,
in which Massiah reaches beyond Escobedo.
Massiah did not confess under the psychological
stimuli of in-custody interrogation. Although con-
fident prediction must await further clarification
by the Court, it may be suggested that while
Escobedo might be thought to push the Massiah
immunity back from the time of indictment to the
time that suspicion is focused on the defendant at
least when he is in custody, Massiah may push the
Escobedo immunity back through the pre-arrest
situation. Furthermore, there is no more logical
basis to restrict Escobedo to situations where it
the question of when the right to counsel begins as
"the most pervasive question in the field of constitu-
tional-criminal procedure today." See Kamisar and
Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Fidd Findings and Legal-Policy Obsenations, 48
MiNr. L. Rnv. 1, 33 (1963). In view of the sweeping
announced bases for decision in Escobedo and the nar-
row statement of what was held, it is difficult to con-
clude to what extent the question has been answered.
130 Compare the similar effort to disclaim judgment
of competing interests in two recent opinions written
in cases concerning the reach of the double jeopardy
prohibiting of the Fifth Amendment: Douglas, J., in
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 738 (1963):
"We resolve any doubt 'in favor of the liberty of the
citizen, rather than exercise what would be an un-
limited, uncertain and arbitrary judicial discretion.'"
(citing United States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cas. 499, 501
(1868)). Compare Goldberg, J., dissenting in United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 475: "With all deference
I suggest the Constitution has resolved this question
of competing interests of the government and the
individual in favor of protecting the individual ......
"3 378 U.S. at 495.
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may be said that suspicion has focused on the sus-
pect, than there is to support a rule limiting im-
munity from interrogation to the time following
indictment. The net result would be the exclusion
of admissions whenever obtained.
Alternatively-or perhaps supplementarily-
admissions made prior to focus of suspicion may be
excludable on fourth as well as fifth and sixth
amendments rationales. If the admission is made
while a defendant is deemed to be under arrest-
and with a functional test rather little may be re-
quired to permit the conclusion of an arrest-the
doctrine of Wong Sun v. United States3 2 may ex-
clude a confession obtained after an arrest without
probable cause, although the reach of Wong Sun,
like that of Massiah and Escobedo, is still largely
unclarified. 13
At least this is clear: If the sole consideration
controlling the resolution of these questions con-




(1) The problem of attempting to achieve a sat-
isfactory level of law enforcement while providing
humane treatment of suspected offenders is mis-
conceived if it is put solely in terms of a conflict be-
tween security and liberty.134 It is astonishing to
note the degree of restriction in liberty of move-
ment about our cities because of the anticipated
dangers of becoming the victim of crime. This fear
must be added to loss of liberty resulting from ac-
tual subjection to criminality. To say this is not to
minimize the extent to which freedom may be lost
through activity of police; it is merely to emphasize
that both must be considered. The maximization
of total liberty is unlikely to be achieved by solely
concerning ourselves with the liberty of persons sus-
pected of crime.
It is also unlikely to be achieved on the assump-
tion that the hard questions of constitutional-
criminal procedure may be answered by merely
'- 371 U.S. 471 (1962), probably already extended
to the states in the per curiain vacation of judgment
and remand of Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493
(1963).
13 See Herman, The Sapreme Court and Restrictions
upon Police Interrogations, 25 Osuo ST. L.J. 449 (1964);
Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouse and Mansions
of Criminal Procedure, reproduced in HowARD, Ctmi-
NAL JUSTICE IN OUR Tm-E (1965).
14 See Barrett, Police Practices and the Law- From
Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAL. L. REv. 11, 14-16
(1962).
examining the text of the Constitution, its histori-
cal origins, by making facile generalizations about
the lessons of history or the nature of the Anglo-
American system of criminal justice, by inflating
individual value-preferences into constitutional
commands, or even by examining previous de-
cisions of the Supreme Court.
(2) The problem is also misconceived if the
battle is deemed one between cops and robbers.
Except to the extent that they may be particularly
vulnerable to criminal attack, a special police need
does not appear to be involved. Indeed one might
accurately suppose that the higher the level of
criminality and the less efficient the approved
techniques of enforcement, the greater will be the
resources which must be allocated to police. The
interest in maintaining an adequate level of law
enforcement is truly a societal one, as is the in-
terest in maintaining an adequate level of indi-
vidual freedom from personal interference and
inhumane treatment in the course of law enforce-
ment.
(3) Although the accuracy of statistics indicat-
ing the incidence of crime in the United States is
limited by different classifications of offenses by
different states, and by differences in reporting
and recording practices, the available evidence in-
dicates that the level of crime is rising and that it is
doing so at a rapid and accelerating rate. 35
(4) While empirical studies are largely non-
existent, there is reason to fear loss of respect for
law and consequent loss of self-enforcement of law
if the legal system is believed to be unable to en-
force the law, 136 and also if the police techniques so
alienate substantial segments of our population as
to result in loss of respect for and cooperation with
law enforcement efforts."l It is suggested that
progress here can best be accomplished by avoiding
"sentimentalism about combatting crime too ener-
getically,"138 while preserving a sensitivity both to
the needs of effective administration of the criminal
law and for maintenance of humane treatment of
suspected offenders.
"' See Uniform Crime Reports-1964, pp. 2-22,
50-53 (1965). With respect to the statistics, see, e.g.,
Beattie, Criminal Statistics in the United States-1960,
51 J. Cpm. L., C. & P.S., 49 (1960). For views critical
to the crime statistics, see, e.g., Foote, Safeguards in
the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 16 (1958); New
York Times, March 22, 1965, p. 1, col. 4.
136 See Barrett, op. cit. supra, n. 134, at 11.
1 See Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution
Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 436,
454 (1964).
138 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1951).
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Furthermore, the objectives of administration of
the criminal law cannot be accurately conceived
solely, or perhaps even primarily, in terms of gen-
eral deterrence. 39 The social need for incapacita-
tion and treatment of dangerous offenders must
also be considered.
(5) It is perhaps easier to form opinions on what
we would prefer our police not to do than to form
opinions on what we would prefer our police to do.
We must recognize that much of the relevant evi-
dence of crime theoretically available is subject to
reservation, not only by the squeamish and the
hypersensitive. Physical evidence presents fourth
and fifth amendment problems. The questioning of
suspects and witnesses presents fourth, fifth and
sixth amendment issues. The use of undercover
agents now presents sixth amendment problems.
The list could be expanded to include other con-
stitutional problems, wiretap objections, privileged
communications, and on.
(6) The wholesale exclusion of credible evidence
itself poses grave dangers to the truth-seeking
process, even if that process is considered solely in
terms of acquitting the innocent. As has been pre-
viously noted, the deterrent efficacy of exclusionary
rules is difficult to predict. But assuming that their
broadening will have significant though incomplete
effect in deterring proscribed police activity, a
number of dangers to the reliability of the acquittal
of the innocent may be foreseen. The explanations
of the innocent, unless verified as soon as possible,
may be beyond corroboration. 40 It may be too late
after defense counsel arrives. In addition, a witness
erroneously suspected of a crime may be charged
and convicted because the actual perpetrator was
not questioned. 4'
Non-interrogation of suspects may result in the
filing of formal charges in situations where ex-
planations obtained in the course of questioning
would result in release. Once such charges have
been filed there is a tendency on the part of police
and prosecution to assume that they have been
properly brought and to press for conviction. While
explanations can be made subsequent to charge,
they may be less believed because of the time avail-
able for fabricating a story and because the oppor-
tunities for corroboration may be reduced. The
139 They appear to be so interpreted in Schwartz,
On Current .Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103
U. PA. L.R. 157 (1954); note, An Historical Argument
for the Right to Counsd During Police Interrogation,
73 YAr. L.J. 1000, 1047-1948 (1964).
140 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence, §867 (3d ed. 1940).
14 See footnote 15, supra.
reputation of many members of the criminal de-
fense bar is such that explanations made after con-
sultation with them may be significantly dis-
counted. Furthermore, even reputable defense
counsel may determine that it is tactically advis-
able to save the defense case until the time of trial,
rather than take a chance that it may be weakened
if disclosed to the prosecution in advance of trial.
By the time the trial begins the prosecution is
likely to be highly motivated to attempt to win its
case. Then all of the multitude of factors, many of
which--such as respective ability of counsel, the
nature of the crime, the attractiveness of defendant
and complainant, the nature of the jury-are
largely irrelevant to the merits of the case, may re-
sult in an unjust conviction. It surely seems de-
sirable that the prosecution process typically, at
least, be begun only when the prosecutor believes
he has a very strong case, if the incidence of con-
viction of the innocent is not to significantly rise.
One can imagine some conscientious investigators
attempting to continue regular interrogation prac-
tices for the assistance which it would provide in
further investigative and prosecutive decisions,
even though it is believed that admissions thus ob-
tained could not be introduced into evidence.
A wide gap between the constitutional standards
for admissibility of evidence and of common sense
notions of its reliability also creates danger that
law enforcement agents will be encouraged to give
false testimony. A practice of what may seem to the
officer to be a necessary telling of "white lies" on
what he believes to be legalistic issues can easily
reduce the trustworthiness of the guilt-determining
process. Increased pressure to obtain accomplice
and informer testimony and to coach other wit-
nesses involve further perils to the innocent.
What has been said is directed solely to the re-
liability of the release of the innocent; it seems ap-
parent that severe restriction or elimination of
confession evidence will greatly reduce the ability
to convict those who otherwise would confess, an
indeterminate, though I suspect a very small per-
centage of whom are innocent.
(7) Humility and realism suggest that there are
serious limits as to what can be effected through
admissibility of evidence doctrines in eliminating
practices of law enforcement which are concededly
abusive. Many of the inadequacies of local law en-
forcement are probably beyond the reach of con-
stitutional corrective efforts, which in any event
can not eliminate lack of resources, political pres-
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sures, and structural inflexibility in the thousands
of state and local governmental units having pri-
mary responsibility for law enforcement.42 There
is the possibility of calling for the assistance of the
federal government with greater frequency in areas
of law enforcement traditionally left to local con-
trol. That, too, has its perils.'43
(8) It is unnecessary to eliminate or severely
restrict the use of confession evidence in order to
stimulate investigation of other sources of evidence.
The nortorious preference of prosecutors for over-
whelming cases includes a desire for as much evi-
dence as can be secured. Thus there is strong in-
centive to obtain independent evidence, if possible,
in any event.'" To the extent that achieving this
objective is made difficult by the limited investi-
gative resources which may be available, there
seems to be no basis for expending these resources
at less efficient means of acquiring evidence, in the
absence of a showing-which has not been made-
that confession evidence is less reliable than its
replacement. There seems to be no rational basis
for preference of less efficient means of investiga-
tion as such.
(9) While considerations of cost are not often
deemed controlling, the expense of a system of ad-
ministration of criminal justice cannot be com-
pletely disregarded. In the past the great majority
of criminal cases have been decided by pleas of
guilty. There is reason to believe that restrictions
on the admissibility of confessions will greatly re-
duce such pleas, and place an enormously greater
burden upon the courts and upon the legal pro-
fession.14' Furthermore, less direct and efficient
means of law enforcement may require very large
expansion in the numbers of police personnel. 146
And if large numbers of cases are to be presented to
the courts without screening by questioning of the
defendants, a very considerable increase in judicial
and legal facilities will have to be provided as
well. 47 While in the abstract one may be willing to
1 See Wigmore, Evidence §851 (3d ed. 1940); Inbau,
Restrictions on the Law of Interrogations and Con-
fessions, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1957).
4 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964) (opin-
ion of Harlan, J., dissenting).
14 See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §2251 (McNaugh. Rev.
1961).
's See Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From
Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CAL. L. REV. 11, 45
(1962).
'"This expansion, while helpful in dealing with
crime on the streets, would seem to promise less as-
sistance in solving crimes occurring elsewhere, as was
the case in Mlassiah and Escobedo.
17 See Barrett, op. cit. supra, n.134, at 45.
pay an unlimited price for justice, it must be borne
in mind that the funds thus poured into the ad-
ministration of the criminal law could alternatively
be utilized in other needed social services.
(10) The fact remains that secret interrogation is
obviously subject to possibilities of abuse. The
accused ordinarily will only have his own testi-
mony to demonstrate such abuse when it occurs.
The circumstances of the obtaining of the con-
fession are highly relevant to its trustworthiness,
even where they do not result in its exclusion
under evidentiary or constitutional standards. In
addition, accurate disclosure of the events sur-
ounding a confession is likely to have a deterrent
effect upon abusive practive.
A number of thoughtful commentators have
proposed that questioning be conducted under
judicial control.'" It is difficult to believe, how-
ever, that judicially supervised questioning would
today be a viable alternative to present police
practices. In White v. Maryland,'" the Supreme
Court reviewed the conviction of a defendant
who had stated that he pleaded guilty at a pre-
liminary hearing. No plea at this stage of the pro-
ceeding was required. Evidence of this admission
had been received at the trial. The conviction was
reversed for denial of right to counsel. Assuming
defense counsel's presence at a judicially super-
vised inquiry, one could not expect to obtain
confessions.
A more hopeful approach to reform would be
more accurate record keeping at police interroga-
tions, perhaps utilizing recording devices or inde-
pendent observers. It would seem that tape-re-
corders, for example, could easily be installed in
police interrogation rooms. They could also be
routinely supplied to police vehicles. Absence of
such a record in spite of feasibility in a particular
case in which the circumstances of a confession
are disputed could well be made an important
factor in due process evaluation. The use of such
devices would itself tend to curb abuse and enable
the courts and juries to penetrate to a substantial
extent the otherwise frequently opaque conflict in
testimony between police and defendants." 0
148 See Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Ac-
cused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRI. L. & CRi.
1014, 1017 (1934); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §851 (3d ed.
1940).
149 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
150 See 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§798a, 851 (3d ed.
1940) (suggesting sound motion pictures); Weisberg,
Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical
View, 52 J. Cnms. L., C. & P.S. 21, 45-46 (1962);
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The discussion of possible ways to minimize
abuses in police questioning while preserving its
social and individual advantages is of little mo-
ment, of course, if the reach of the fourth, fifth,
sixth and fourteenth amendments is extended so as
to eliminate the questioning of suspects entirely.
AN EPILOGUE
The views which have been expressed in this
article are concededly inconsistent with the trend
of recent decisions. The writer believes that these
cases do not point the way to a desirable or even
Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v.
United Stales and Escobedo v. Illinwis, 49 MINN. L.
Rxv. 47, 84-91 (1964).
viable system of law enforcement. But it must be
admitted that we are now embarked on a new
adventure, and past experience does not foreclose
the possibility that the constitutional experiments
will be satisfactory ones. Much still undoubtedly
depends upon details of procedural requirements
which are yet to be worked out.
If pessimism turns out to be justified, in the
long run events may be expected to generate pres-
sures which must be recognized even by a legal
system which has been placed as far from popular
control as ours. The skeptical may perhaps take
some comfort from the realization that constitu-
tional decisions in matters of criminal procedure
are particularly subject to reexamination.
